And so it took a very, very long time to develop and at that point ultimately failed. But there was no program, no structure, no administration.
It was put out there as a kind of a broad directive. So, the problem was different entities took different approaches and it wasn’t really crisply defined when the policy was launched, which led to a lot of its problems.īut it was very much top down. looked at it from a much more social services approach: “Let’s see what we can do educationally in communities, let’s see what we can do working with religious authorities to try to provide resilience against these ideas, these ideologies that are so foreign to mainstream Islam if we’re going to talk about that strand of the threat.” The FBI, I believe, took it to say, “let’s work with communities to try to find out as early as possible who the bad guys are, so we can do some sort of intervention or do surveillance or engage in a law enforcement activity.” What problems did you find with the policy?ĭifferent agencies took to mean different things. How can we reduce the supply side to some extent, if you’re going to look at it from an economic point of view, of people who adopt these ideologies and are willing to engage in violence, what can we do to actually stop that process, so we have fewer people, fewer insurgents or radical extremists for our military to address, for our FBI to address. What President Obama was doing (and to some degrees even in the Bush administration before then), was looking at the idea of preventative measures. Conversation highlights have been edited for readability and clarity Conversation Highlights
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